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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ________________ 
 
RESTANI, Judge. 
 Following a trial in this action brought by 
plaintiff-appellant Affiliated Manufacturers, Inc. ("AMI") 
alleging additional money was due on a contract, the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of defendant-appellee Aluminum 
Company of America ("Alcoa") on its counterclaim for failure to 
satisfy contract specifications and breach of warranties.  AMI 
appeals from the district court's grant of a motion in limine 
brought by Alcoa to exclude certain documents and deposition 
testimony as evidence of settlement negotiations under Fed. R. 
Evid. 408.  For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the 
judgment of the district court. 
 
 I. 
 AMI originally filed its complaint on June 3, 1991, 
against Alcoa in the Superior Court of New Jersey, seeking 
payment of invoices amounting to $488,130.  The case was removed 
to the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey on July 2, 1991.  Alcoa filed a motion in limine on 
November 5, 1993, and a supplemental submission dated 
November 23, 1993, seeking to exclude portions of a total of 
fifteen items from admission at trial, including excerpts from 
correspondence between AMI and Alcoa, Alcoa internal memoranda 
and deposition testimony.  The district court granted this motion 
  
with respect to thirteen of the fifteen items, by memorandum 
order dated December 23, 1993. 
 The case was tried before a jury from March 1, 1994 to 
April 6, 1994.  The jury returned a verdict of $100,000 for Alcoa 
on its counterclaim, and rejected all of AMI's claims.  AMI moved 
for a new trial, but the motion was denied on July 19, 1994.  
This appeal was filed on August 17, 1994. 
 The dispute between AMI and Alcoa arose from a contract 
for design and fabrication of an automated greenline handling 
system ("the system").1  The system built under this contract was 
never put into production.  During the construction of the 
system, AMI submitted to Alcoa invoices for work not included in 
the contract.  Upon receipt, Alcoa processed the invoices for 
payment.  The parties disagree concerning one unpaid invoice for 
hardware costs (four screen printers) totalling $280,000, and 
another unpaid invoice for $208,130 in software costs.  These two 
invoices were submitted by AMI at the end of the project, on 
April 5, 1990, to the attention of Thomas Pollak ("Pollak"), 
Alcoa's procurement manager. 
 Pollak consulted with Alcoa employees Earle Lockwood 
("Lockwood") and Phil Kasprzyk ("Kasprzyk") concerning the 
invoices, because both were closely involved with the project.  
                     
     
1/ The system is designed to produce green, unframed 
interconnect devices for the electronics industry that are used 
to package computer chips.  The system is intended to require a 
minimum of human intervention and consists of a series of 
mechanical components physically integrated and then coordinated 
through computer technology.  Appellant's Br. at 6. 
  
In memoranda, Lockwood and Kasprzyk each evaluated one of the two 
invoices from AMI.  At a meeting between Pollak, Lockwood and 
AMI's president, Benson Austin ("Austin"), on May 2, 1990, one 
topic of discussion was the issue of unpaid invoices, as 
reflected in handwritten contemporaneous notes.  Appellant's App. 
at 54-57 ("App."). 
 Alcoa's original motion in limine sought exclusion of 
portions of the Lockwood and Kasprzyk memoranda and a letter from 
Austin dated June 26, 1990, as well as portions of the meeting 
notes from May 2, deposition exhibits and transcripts that were 
not specifically described.  App. at 3-5.  At the request of the 
district court, Alcoa supplied an additional submission detailing 
twelve items (meeting notes, deposition testimony and letters) 
for which Alcoa also sought portions excluded from admission at 
trial.  See App. at 17-21.  Each of the thirteen items, for which 
the district court ruled portions inadmissible, will be discussed 
in turn. 
 In particular, the district court excluded portions of 
the memorandum by Kasprzyk dated May 1, 1990, and Kasprzyk's 
deposition testimony concerning the memorandum.  Affiliated 
Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, Civ. No. 91-2877, at 7 
(D.N.J. Dec. 23, 1993) ("AMI I").  The memorandum stated in part 
 
 AMI's claim of 6251 hours of programming time 
is [un]reasonable when you consider the 
additional 4100 hours that ALCOA personnel 
contributed. 
 
 . . . . 
 
  
 Since the original purchase order for the 
line did not thoroughly specify the 
capability of the line, I feel that AMI has a 
legitimate claim to some software 
compensation.  I feel that AMI should only be 
compensated for 1/3 of the requested amount 
since the line does not meet the 600 card per 
hour specification . . . .2 
 
 
App. at 11; see AMI I at 7.  The district court also excluded a 
section of the handwritten notes of the May 2, 1990 meeting 
between Alcoa and AMI, which contained a mathematical calculation 
of numbers, as well as the terms "software proposal" and "above 
settlement proposal by Alcoa unacceptable."  AMI I at 12; see 
App. at 57. 
 The district court further excluded the following 
excerpts of Pollak's deposition testimony regarding the purposes 
of the May 2 meeting and a subsequent meeting held on January 7, 
1991: 
 Q: [W]hat was the purpose of the 
visit . . . on May the 2nd, 1990? 
 
 A: To the best of my recollection an attempt 
to reach agreement -- 
 
 . . . . 
 
 Q: So this was about a month after the 
shipment of the equipment that you were there 
with Mr. Lockwood? 
 
 A: Yes. 
 
 Q: Do you recall the purpose of that visit? 
 
                     
     
2/  Parties do not dispute that the word "unreasonable" was 
intended. 
  
 A: An attempt to reach agreement to get the 
equipment to perform in accordance with the 
specifications. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 Q: The only other recorded visit that we have 
was on January 7th, 1991, . . . . [W]hat was 
the purpose of your visit? 
 
 A: My recollection is to reach settlement. 
 
 
App. at 25-27 (Dep. Tr. of Thomas Pollak at 35-37); see AMI I at 
9-10.  The court also excluded portions of Austin's deposition 
testimony regarding his discussions with Pollak, particularly the 
following statements: 
 Q. You were in the process of trying to 
negotiate a settlement? 
 
 A. No.  [Mr. Pollak] was.  I wasn't.  Not at 
all. 
 
 Q. You had presented a demand, ALCOA had made 
a proposal to settle the dispute? 
 
 A. Yes.  At this point, he said, I'm not 
going to pay you for any profits.  I'm just 
going to pay you for your cost . . ., and I 
told him that I wasn't in business to supply 
products with manufacturing costs.  I'm 
sorry.  I have to make a profit. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 A. Well, this had to do with the ALCOA offer.  
They offered what the cost of goods sold, 
$83,382. . . .  The ALCOA offer of $101,000, 
which is from this batch, gives us a loss of 
$12,000. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 A. I, frankly, was very surprised that we see 
such opposition from our, what we thought 
were most reasonable settlements on these, 
  
because you must remember we were still 
interested in doing more business with 
ALCOA . . . . 
 
 . . . .  
 
 A. Well, Mr. Pollak accepted both bills, and 
his comment was I will offer you so much on 
the printers now. . . .  I will offer you 
this much now, and you change your invoice 
and we will pay it.  
 
 . . . . 
 
 A. I think that offer was either made in the 
meeting or it was made in the letter, I don't 
which. 
 
 
App. at 47-52 (Dep. Tr. of Benson Austin at 74, 76-77, 88-90); 
see AMI I at 11-12.  
 Additionally, the district court excluded portions of 
four letters from Pollak to Austin dated June 11, August 22, 
September 24, and October 31, 1990.  These letters, respectively, 
contained the following statements: 
 As a compromise, I will split the $7,500 
amortization fee, adding $15,000 to my offer. 
 
App. at 66; AMI I at 13; 
 
 Your letter of 1990 June 26 presented your 
logic for turning down our third proposed 
settlement for the screen printers. . . .  I 
suggest we resolve this equipment issue by 
agreeing on my final offer for a 
settlement . . . .  Please cancel your 
invoice . . . and issue a new invoice. 
 
 
App. at 63; AMI I at 13; 
 
 My offer still stands subject to potential 
reductions based on Alcoa's efforts in 
achieving an acceptable production rate.  
 
  
 . . . . 
 
 Alcoa will inform AMI of the results of our 
efforts and will make a final settlement 
proposal taking into account all cost 
incurred by Alcoa. 
 
 
App. at 69; AMI I at 13; and 
 
 We are now at the point where we can make our 
final settlement offer for the equipment 
furnished against our purchase order. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 In an effort to finally resolve this matter, 
Alcoa proposes that AMI submit an invoice for 
$195,928 for additional hardware costs for 
the 1655 printers and $79,358.00 to cover the 
software costs . . . .  Alcoa will pay this 
amount.  Of course, Alcoa will expect AMI to 
execute an appropriate release. 
 
 
App. at 74-75; AMI I at 13-14.  The district court also excluded 
a portion of a letter from Austin to Pollak dated June 26, 1990, 
in which Austin explains the reasons why he chose to turn down 
Alcoa's offer to pay a certain dollar amount for the screen 
printers, referring to mathematical calculations concerning the 
printer charges.  App. at 14-15; AMI I at 7-8. 
 Also, the district court excluded the Lockwood 
memorandum dated January 3, 1991, and Lockwood's deposition 
testimony concerning the memorandum.  In the memo, Lockwood 
discussed Alcoa's proposal to pay "additional money," and 
indicated: 
 In the interest of getting the line into 
production ALCOA decided to proceed with the 
software optimization on its own. . . .  In 
doing so we incurred costs totalling 
  
approximately $129,000 and informed AMI that 
we would subtract these costs from the amount 
they had requested. 
 
 
App. at 7-9; AMI I at 6-7.  The deposition testimony excluded 
contained references to the January 3 memo, as follows: 
 
 That is the reason the bills were brought to 
my attention, because our costs had 
significantly increased and those just 
increased it even more. . . . I was asked an 
opinion . . . [about disputed billing 
figures]. 
 
 
App. at 34; AMI I at 10. 
 Lastly, the district court found excludable a February 
15, 1991 letter from Austin to Pollak, stating in part, 
 Without going into any further detail, I am 
willing to give an allowance of 
$12,000.00 . . .  
 
 [Y]our letter of August 22, 1990 makes an 
offer to cover AMI's costs . . .  
 
 . . . . 
 
 Our original billing was for $488,130.00, so 
there is not much of a difference between now 
and then.  You did want to know for what we 
would settle, without it going to litigation.  
This offer is being made without prejudice to 
AMI's normal rights in this matter. 
 
 
App. at 61; AMI I at 12-13. 
 AMI challenges the district court's ruling as to the 
portions of each of the 13 items excluded from admission at 
trial. 
 
  
 II. 
 Appellate jurisdiction in this case is based upon 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988), as the district court's order was final.  
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
and § 1441(a) (1988). 
 Abuse of discretion is the standard of review for 
denial of a request for a new trial based on the district court's 
alleged error in ruling on the admissibility of evidence.  See 
Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1496 (3d Cir. 1993).  A 
district court's ruling as to admissibility of evidence is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, where the 
question presented involves the application of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.  See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 
749 (3d Cir. 1994).  To the extent the district court's ruling 
turns upon an interpretation of Rule 408, it is subject to 
plenary review.  Id.  Where the trial court has made a factual 
finding in determining admissibility of evidence, the clearly 
erroneous standard is applied.  United States v. 68.94 Acres of 
Land, 918 F.2d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Japanese Elec. 
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 257 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. 
granted in part sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 471 U.S. 1002 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 475 
U.S. 574 (1986).  Under this standard, a finding of fact may be 
reversed on appeal only if "it is completely devoid of a credible 
evidentiary basis or bears no rational relationship" to the 
evidence in support.  American Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., 
Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370-71 (3d Cir. 1987). 
  
 
 III. 
 A. Fed. R. Evid. 408 
 1. Evidence of negotiations to settle a disputed claim 
 AMI contends that the district court erred in its 
interpretation and application of Rule 408.  AMI alleges that the 
court took an extreme view of the meaning of "settlement 
negotiations" as contemplated within the rule.  AMI asserts that 
the district court incorrectly found that even an "apparent 
difference of opinion between the parties" could trigger an 
exclusion under the rule.  See AMI I at 6 (citing Alpex Computer 
Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 770 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).  
Further, AMI argues that the district court erred in its factual 
finding that a dispute existed between the parties. 
 The evidentiary exclusion for compromise and offers to 
compromise reads as follows: 
  Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering 
or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or 
offering or promising to accept, a valuable 
consideration in compromising or attempting 
to compromise a claim which was disputed as 
to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible to prove liability for or 
invalidity of the claim or its amount.  
Evidence of conduct or statements made in 
compromise negotiations is likewise not 
admissible.  This rule does not require the 
exclusion of any evidence otherwise 
discoverable merely because it is presented 
in the course of compromise negotiations.  
This rule also does not require exclusion 
when the evidence is offered for another 
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of 
a witness, negativing a contention of undue 
delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a 
criminal investigation or prosecution. 
  
 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 408.  The application of the rule is limited to 
evidence concerning settlement or compromise of a claim, where 
the evidence is offered to establish liability, or the validity 
or amount of the claim.  Additionally, Rule 408 has been 
interpreted as applicable to an actual dispute, or at least an 
apparent difference of view between the parties concerning the 
validity or amount of a claim.  2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. 
Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 408[01] at 408-12 (1994); Kenneth 
S. Brown et al., McCormick on Evidence § 266, at 466 (John 
William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).  The policy behind Rule 408 is 
to encourage freedom of discussion with regard to compromise.  
See Weinstein's Evidence, supra, ¶ 408[01] at 408-10. 
 AMI argues that the case law clearly delineates 
distinctions as to what constitutes "a claim which was disputed," 
and characterizes the excluded documents at issue as merely 
evidencing discussions that had not yet reached the "dispute" 
stage for Rule 408 purposes.  Thus, AMI maintains that Rule 408 
is inapplicable here, arguing that the intended construction of 
Rule 408 is that there must be a threat or contemplation of 
litigation, that goes beyond conduct or statements made to 
resolve differences of opinion as to the validity or amount of a 
claim.  AMI relies chiefly upon the holdings from other circuits 
to support its view that the district court misinterpreted the 
term "dispute" and misapplied the rule.  Alcoa responds that AMI 
  
has mischaracterized these decisions, as well as the district 
court's reasoning, in its discussion of relevant precedent. 
 In reaching its conclusion to apply the Rule 408 
exclusion, the district court reasoned that the Tenth Circuit's 
application of Rule 408, in Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. 
dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978), was too restrictive in its 
establishment of "the point of threatened litigation [as] a clear 
cut-off point" for application.  AMI I at 5 (quoting Big O Tire, 
561 F.2d at 1373).  Instead, the district court adopted the view 
articulated by the court in Alpex, 770 F. Supp. at 164-65, 
finding that the Alpex court "considered factors apart from any 
indicia of threatened litigation."  AMI I at 5-6.  The district 
court then proceeded to analyze the facts concerning each 
document and deposition excerpt that Alcoa had proposed for 
exclusion. 
 In Big O Tire, a small tire manufacturer that had used 
the term "Big Foot" in its business was approached by Goodyear 
Tire, who wished to use the same term for a national ad campaign 
for a new product.  561 F.2d at 1368.  Both parties participated 
in a series of discussions about how to proceed, and Goodyear 
sought assurance from Big O Tire that it would not object to such 
use.  Id.  In addition to phone conversations and meetings to 
discuss the issue further, correspondence indicated that Big O 
Tire requested that Goodyear conclude its ad campaign as soon as 
possible, and that Goodyear responded it would use the concept as 
long as it "continued to be a helpful advertising device."  Id.  
  
The district court in Big O Tire determined that phone and letter 
communications between the parties prior to litigation concerning 
use of the trademark did not fall within the Rule 408 exclusion, 
as the calls and letters were merely "business communications."  
See id. at 1368, 1372-73.  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit concluded that the district court did not commit manifest 
error in finding the disputed statements were business 
communications because the discussions at issue "had not 
crystallized to the point of threatened litigation."  Id. at 
1373. 
 To the extent Big O Tire establishes a strict standard 
for application of Rule 408, it was rejected by Alpex.  See 770 
F. Supp. at 164.  The plaintiff in Alpex held certain rights 
relating to a patent for video games and pursued a program to 
combat infringement by sending letters from counsel offering 
certain alleged infringers the opportunity to settle what 
plaintiff viewed as meritorious infringement claims.  Id. at 162.  
In some instances these notices led to extended negotiations, 
licensing agreements and settlement without litigation, while in 
other instances litigation was pursued.  Id. at 162-63.  The 
Alpex court determined that certain license agreements reached in 
the absence of litigation fell within the purview of the Rule 408 
exclusion.  Id. at 165.  In its analysis, the Alpex court 
examined various factors in addition to indicia of threat of 
litigation, that might call for application of the exclusion.  
Id. at 164-65. 
  
 We believe that AMI has oversimplified the Big O Tire 
and Alpex holdings.  Regarding the issue of when a "dispute" 
between parties exists, the Alpex court acknowledged that 
litigation need not have commenced for Rule 408 to apply.  770 F. 
Supp. at 164; see North Am. Biologicals, Inc. v. Illinois 
Employers Ins., 931 F.2d 839, 841 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding 
letter written prior to suit excludable under Rule 408 as offer 
of settlement).  Parties here concede this point.  Further, Big O 
Tire is consistent with Alpex on this point.  See 561 F.2d at 
1373.  Because of the applicable standard of review, it is not 
entirely clear how the Tenth Circuit would view exclusion, rather 
than inclusion, of negotiations made prior to "the point of 
threatened litigation".  Furthermore, the Alpex court did not, as 
AMI asserts, adopt in toto the view that a dispute must 
"crystallize[] to the point of threatened litigation" before 
evidence of settlement negotiations are excludable.  Rather, 
Alpex and other courts make clear that the Rule 408 exclusion 
applies where an actual dispute or a difference of opinion 
exists, rather than when discussions crystallize to the point of 
threatened litigation.  See Alpex, 770 F. Supp. at 163; Dallis v. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 768 F.2d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing 
Weinstein's Evidence, supra, ¶ 408[01]) (affirming admission of 
testimony involving settlement of similar claim between party to 
action and third party, where no evidence that validity or amount 
of payment had been in dispute). 
 Accordingly, we hold that the district court's 
construction of Rule 408 did not constitute legal error.  As a 
  
matter of interpretation, the meaning of "dispute" as employed in 
the rule includes both litigation and less formal stages of a 
dispute, and this meaning "is unchanged by the broader scope of 
Rule 408."  Weinstein's Evidence, supra, ¶ 408[01] at 408-12.  
The district court properly interpreted the scope of the term 
"dispute" to include a clear difference of opinion between the 
parties here concerning payment of two invoices. 
 The facts of each case bear upon the trial court's 
exercise of discretion to apply the exclusion.  See Alpex, 770 F. 
Supp. at 164-65; Bradbury v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 
1356, 1364 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding if application of Rule 408 
exclusion doubtful, better practice is to exclude evidence of 
compromise negotiations).  Admittedly, it can be difficult to 
discern whether an "offer" was made to attempt to "compromise a 
claim."   The existence of a disputed claim as well as the timing 
of the offer are relevant to making this determination.  Pierce 
v. F.R. Tripler & Co., 955 F.2d 820, 827 (2d Cir. 1992).  The 
district court here found that inherent in each of the documents 
presented for exclusion was the parties' disagreement or dispute 
as to the amount and the validity of the invoice presented for 
payment.  AMI I at 6-14. 
   The district court found that when viewed in context, 
the April 5, 1990 letter from Austin at AMI was evidence of a 
dispute concerning the printer design and software programming.  
See id. at 2-3, 6.  As this letter was not among the disputed 
documents, we need not consider whether a dispute arose as early 
as April 5.  Following receipt of the April 5 letter and 
  
invoices, Kasprzyk described to Pollak in his May 1, 1990 
memorandum his evaluation of the amount billed by AMI for 
software and his assessment of the merits of AMI's claim.  App. 
at 11.  This is the earliest document in dispute.  In this 
memorandum, Kasprzyk concluded that 
 [s]ince the original purchase order for the 
line did not thoroughly specify the 
capability of the line, I feel that AMI has a 
legitimate claim to some software 
compensation.  I feel that AMI should only be 
compensated for 1/3 of the requested amount 
since the line does not meet [certain 
specifications].  I also feel that this is 
appropriate due to the AMI's overall inferior 
performance on system software. 
 
 
Id.   
 AMI characterizes this memorandum as an "evaluation," 
implying that it did not evidence a dispute under Rule 408.  See 
Appellant's Br. at 11.  We also need not reach the question of 
whether the mere existence of an internal evaluation such as this 
memorandum provides evidence of a dispute.  In his deposition 
Pollak stated that "[i]n preparation for [a May 2 settlement] 
meeting, I asked Phil Kasprzyk, an Alcoa engineer familiar with 
the project, his view of the disputed invoices."3  App. at 79.  
That Kasprzyk's evaluation was written in order to prepare Pollak 
for a meeting to discuss a possible compromise necessarily 
                     
     
3/  In an affidavit, Austin denied Pollak's statement that 
one purpose of the May 2 meeting was to attempt settlement of the 
dispute.  App. at 86.  As we previously indicated, however, the 
notes of the May 2 meeting contained mathematical calculations, 
as well as the terms "software proposal" and "above settlement 
proposal by Alcoa unacceptable."  App. at 57. 
  
demonstrates that at least as of May 1 there was a dispute.  We 
cannot say that the district court erred in concluding that a 
dispute existed as of May 1 and that the documents at issue 
evidenced attempts to compromise the dispute. 
 
 2. Exclusion of internal memoranda 
 AMI's second argument is that the district court erred 
in applying the Rule 408 exclusion to internal memoranda that 
were a part of the fifteen items offered for exclusion under Rule 
408.  AMI argues that the rule only protects conduct and 
statements during negotiations, and does not protect internal 
memoranda, or deposition testimony concerning these memoranda.  
Alcoa responds that such an interpretation and application of 
Rule 408 would contradict the rule's purpose, serving instead to 
discourage open settlement discussions. 
 The district court found both the Lockwood and Kasprzyk 
memoranda, and testimony concerning these documents, to be 
eligible for exclusion under Rule 408.  AMI I at 8-9.  The 
district court declined to adopt the reasoning in Blue Circle 
Atl., Inc. v. Falcon Materials, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 516, 522 (D. 
Md. 1991), aff'd without op., 960 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1992), which 
interpreted Rule 408 to require communication of internal 
memoranda to an opposing party, and instead relied upon the 
holding in Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 
1981).  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Ramada 
upheld the district court's exclusion of an internal report "made 
in the course of an effort to compromise."  Id. at 1106-07.  The 
  
Fifth Circuit quoted the text of Rule 408, that "[e]vidence of 
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise 
not admissible."  Id. at 1106.  In construing this language, the 
district court here determined that the 
 failure of Alcoa to communicate the internal 
memoranda to AMI is not dispositive in the 
context of a Rule 408 analysis; rather, any 
statements prepared by Alcoa representatives 
that function as the basis for compromise 
negotiations demonstrate 'evidence of 
conduct' in compromise negotiations. 
 
 
AMI I at 8-9.  The district court further found that the 
memoranda served as a basis for calculation of compromise 
figures.  Thus, the court concluded that the Rule 408 exclusion 
applied.  Id. at 9. 
 First, AMI argues that the legislative history of Rule 
408 suggests a different result and that the district court has 
incorrectly broadened the language of the rule.  Second, AMI 
asserts that the district court should have followed Blue Circle, 
and that the court disregarded an important fact in Ramada that 
narrows its application. 
 Under the common law, offers of compromise were 
excluded from evidence, but the exclusion did not extend to 
"admissions of fact, even though made in the course of compromise 
negotiations, unless hypothetical, stated to be 'without 
prejudice,' or so connected with the offer as to be inseparable 
from it."  10 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 408.01[9] (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995) 
(Advisory Committee's Note on Proposed Rule 408).  Thus, AMI 
  
argues, Rule 408 was intended to remedy the common law rule by 
expanding it merely to include evidence of conduct or statements, 
but not internal memoranda.  Id.  While Rule 408 was specifically 
designed to cover admissions of fact, its language is 
considerably broader than that necessary to accomplish this 
change. 
 Next, in Ramada, the report sought to be excluded was 
generated by an architect hired for the purpose of preparing an 
analysis of defects in the construction of a motel that plaintiff 
had contracted to have built.  644 F.2d at 1099, 1106.  Testimony 
in Ramada indicated that the architect was "commissioned by 
Ramada to prepare a report that would function as a basis of 
settlement negotiations regarding the alleged defects in the 
motel."  Id. at 1107.  Thus, the Fifth Circuit determined that 
because the report had been prepared as a tool for settlement 
negotiations, it fell within the scope of Rule 408.  Id. 
 In contrast to Ramada, the District Court of Maryland 
in Blue Circle interpreted Rule 408 as inapplicable to internal 
memoranda, unless they were communicated to the other side in an 
attempt at settlement.  760 F. Supp. at 523, citing 23 Charles 
Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 5303 (1980)).  We reject this interpretation of Rule 
408 as too broad, and find that the district court in Blue Circle 
overstated the meaning of the treatise citation.4       
                     
     
4/ The treatise states that "[o]f course, the mere fact that 
information may be useful in compromise negotiations does not 
mean that it is privileged where it was never communicated to the 
opponent."  Federal Practice and Procedure, supra, § 5303, at 179 
  
 AMI argues that the decision in United States v. 320.0 
Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1979), also should have 
guided the district court, and that Ramada is distinguishable 
from the case at hand.  In fact, it is 320.0 Acres that is 
distinguishable from both Ramada and the case at hand.  In 320.0 
Acres, the Fifth Circuit elected not to exclude a governmental 
report discussing evaluation of fair market value to be paid to a 
condemnee, on the basis that appraisals were not offers, but 
rather were "statements of the amount which the Government 
believes the landowner is constitutionally entitled to should 
negotiations fail and condemnation proceedings be initiated."  
Id. at 823-25.  These statements of amount made by the government 
were not compromise offers and were required by statute, a 
situation quite different from those of the Alcoa memoranda. 
(..continued) 
n.26 (citing United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 
705, 711-12 (D.C. Minn. 1976)).  In Reserve Mining, a party 
facing Rule 37 sanctions raised as a last defense the argument 
that numerous economic and technological feasibility studies 
withheld from discovery fell within the Rule 408 exclusion.  412 
F. Supp. at 711-12.  The district court in Reserve Mining 
determined that the party to be sanctioned could not shield from 
discovery all documents that represented factual matters that 
might be or were incorporated in a settlement proposal.  Id. at 
712. 
 Reserve Mining does not define clearly a rule for 
treatment of internal memoranda, as Blue Circle implies.  Rather, 
the Reserve Mining court noted that the party's request for Rule 
408 exclusion, if granted, would permit the exclusion of studies 
done long before any dispute arose.  See 412 F. Supp. at 711-12.  
Such is not the case here, as the Kasprzyk memorandum was written 
immediately before, and in preparation for, the first meeting in 
which the settlement of the dispute over invoices was discussed.   
The Lockwood memorandum was formulated after a number of 
correspondence concerning settlement figures. 
  
 The court notes that the Eleventh Circuit's decision in 
Blu-J, Inc. v. Kemper C.P.A. Group, 916 F.2d 637, 642 (11th Cir. 
1990), reinforces the reasoning in Ramada.  In Blu-J, the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld the exclusion of evidence of an 
accountant's evaluation "prepared by mutual agreement of [the 
parties] as part of their settlement negotiations."  Id. at 641.  
This independent evaluation in Blu-J was found to fall within the 
Rule 408 exception, and the holding in Ramada, because although 
the parties disagreed as to whether "an offer was on the table" 
during "negotiations," both parties agreed that the evaluation 
was done to promote settlement of a dispute.  Id. at 642.  Here, 
the district court found the Alcoa memoranda was prepared as a 
basis for compromise negotiations, particularly because the 
memoranda appeared to be intended to assist in calculation of 
compromise figures discussed subsequently.  AMI I at 9.  The 
district court's analysis is consistent with the view of Rule 408 
expressed in the Ramada and Blu-J decisions of our sister 
circuits, which we find persuasive.  Thus, we hold that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding internal 
memoranda prepared for use in discussion of settlement of AMI 
invoice amounts.5 
 
 IV. 
                     
     
5/  Our conclusion that the district court properly excluded 
evidence under Rule 408 eliminates the need to reach the issue of 
whether the district court's decision resulted in harmless error. 
  
 The district court properly interpreted and applied the 
Rule 408 exclusion to suppress portions of the documents and 
testimony discussed herein.  Further, the court's factual finding 
as to the existence of a dispute between the parties was not 
clearly erroneous.  Thus, the district court did not err in its 
denial of the motion for new trial on the basis of its rulings as 
to evidentiary exclusions.  The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
